Monday, July 10, 2006

Against the Space Hijackers

In the insipid spirit of the sixties, and slavish genuflection before poorly understood metaphysics, since 1999 the London anarchist group the Space Hijackers have been involving themselves in a series of self-consciously anti-capitalist actions, whilst all the while spouting pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric, and bad poetics of transgression.



In mock heroic terms both of distance and irony, they proclaim, “Our group is dedicated to battling the constant oppressive encroachment onto public spaces of institutions, corporations and urban planners. We oppose the way that public space is being eroded and replaced by corporate profit making space.”

The utter poverty of ambition this statement evinces is simply staggering - here is a group smugly declaring that they are dedicated to battling, and then saying no more. Not only does this conception lack even the very notion of victory, but moreover the radical thrust here in fact expresses a fundamental hostility to the even the very possibility of such an outcome. This group expressly declare that they dedicated to battling, if victory was attained than battle would have to cease, thus insofar insofar as this group truly is dedicated to battling, it logically follows that they must also be dedicated to somehow preventing victory at any cost – whether by hook or by crook, finally no distinction is necessary.

This point is not just clever rhetorics, and this same kind of sad, self-defeating structure – democracy, contingency, blahblahblah - is by no means unique to the Space Hijackers alone. We encounter it again in the work of Simon Critchley, and in fact Critchley himself is just the most intelligent exemplification of a much more widespread tendency – namely, the sweetly sick undead Derridean brood, still indefinitely deferring their slouching towards Bethelehem to be born as we speak.

In the Ethics of Deconstruction, Critchley puts it like this, “within the suspension of choice, within the undecidability of a double reading, a certain decision or event announces itself, a heteronomous moment of alterity that interrupts the text of philosophy and maintains itself as an interruption or blind spot within philosophical or critical discourse. This event is the ethics of deconstructive reading.”

To put it briefly, the problem with this is not that it is wrong. The problem is – to paraphrase Pauli – is that it is not even wrong. Unwilling to committ to anything beyond a certain specious fidelity to his master, what Critchley is saying here effectively amounts to nothing at all - it cannot even be criticized, since it carefully avoids making anything even close to a statement.



We are hereby invited to consider the ethics of deconstructive reading in terms of an interruption of radical alterity into a hithereto more or less homogenous philosophical text – an interruption that, we are told, maintains itself as a blindspot. The problem here is – how exactly can this be an ethics? It is heteronmous, it seems to issue no demands, it appears as entirely circular in both content and form, it explicitly positions itself as precisely leading nowhere, and it seems to come and go more or less mystically - essentially beyond the scope of any conscious thinking - according entirely to its own devices. Clearly, there is a certain vital reality to this picture – but that is entirely the problem, since the point of ethics is not to get back to brute reality, but rather to escape from it, while at the same time still remaining inside it – this is to say (and I am not afraid of this phrase) take a transcendental position upon it.

In the name of alterity, Critchley evades this demand, and from here we are only one short step away from the axiom of sophism par excellance – namely, that such an evasion itself constitutes truth. Smiling vacantly, blinking their big stupid eyes, the Space Hijackers blandly put it thusly, “We are not attempting to produce some kind of revolutionary other, which is almost destined to fail.”



This basic squint-eyed, mean-streak of principled conservativism makes for an especially ugly sight when it is combined with self-serving rhetorical radicalism – in cases like these, it goes beyond just a bad smell: one can almost already taste the rotting undead flesh, as it comes lurching idiotically towards you.

27 Comments:

Nate said...

Daniel you do vitriol quite well. In case your interested, either as an alternative or as target for more vitriol:

The Surveillance Camera Players
http://www.notbored.org/the-scp.html

The Association of Autonomous Astronauts
http://www.uncarved.org/aaa.html

1:41 AM  
Wesley said...

I think that there's nothing more boring than vitriol. What other discourse, in its form, is more different to philosophy?

6:07 AM  
Wesley said...

Daniel, I was wondering, do you think that there's any difference between morality and ethics?

10:44 AM  
daniel said...

Wesley - interesting theory. If no other discourse is more different to philosophy than vitriol, if vitroil embodies the absolutely different, than this means (according to Critchley) that the ethics of deconstruction amount to an ethics of vitriol.

This, at least, I can work with.

1:08 PM  
Nate said...

I disagree. There's a long history of philosophic vitriol: Hegel's description of bad views of the absolute as the "night in which all cows are black," Schelling's description of the same, with a different target, as group of men sitting in a circle all resting on the knee of the one behind (thus really resting on nothing sure), almost anything Marx and Debord ever wrote about anyone, moments of Badiou, etc.

If friendship and love can be valid topics and affects for philosophical writings so can - and should - scorn and hate, given that there's at least as much in the world that deserves these latter as deserves the former.

7:45 PM  
gpatrick said...

It seems that in the past a masculinist politics (that desires a clear and programmatic imperative) feminized its opposition, now it has recourse to figures of the bloodless, the undead.

10:08 PM  
Wesley said...

Nate,

Of course there's writing that mixes philosophy and vitriol, but is the best way to define philosophy according to the history of the philosophical canon, or is it more effective to try to define philosophy according to its form? Afterall, in its most simple terms philosophy is 'the love of knowledge', not its disdain, and love is a formal relation.

Of course scorn and hate should be objects of philosophical inquiry, but must this inquiry take the form of the object it wants to understand? Again, I would think that the purpose of philosophy is to try to understand this sense of being contaminated by the other you want to expel, rather than submitting to some 'specious fidelity to this master.'

1:27 AM  
daniel said...

gpatrick - please explain to me: What is "masculinist" about the desire for a clear and programmatic imperative in politics. What would you prefer - a hypothetically "feminist" politics, equating to some kind of vague hysteria? You are the one drawing gender binaries here, not me, and I do not really understand your claim.

As for the undead metaphors, these have been in circulation for some time, I refer you Marx.

Wesley - I love your genteel nobility.

5:15 AM  
Wesley said...

Thanks Daniel, if you're not being sarcastic. Since you seem to be fairly serious most of the time, I'll assume you are here too.

Now all I need are some genteel looks, rather than these oafish Australian ones. Who knows, maybe one day.

9:25 AM  
derevaun seraun said...

it's not really all that helpful for the left to spend so much time condemning other strains of anti-capitalist thought. your insistence on a 'clear and programmatic imperative in politics' is an authoritarian universalist desire for precisely what has become impossible, indeed the very impossibility of which can be seen as the condition of possibility for politics - let us not forget the role of (historical) contingency in shaping revolutionary moments and revolutionary momentum. i usually associate call for dogmas, shibboleths and imperatives with nostalgia and a lack of creative thought and action, a unwillingness to seriously consider the implications of the suppleness of capital or the state or the system insofar as they allow for recuperations and reinvention. the clenched-fist serious revolutionary pose is as much an empty gesture as liberal handwringing.

8:51 AM  
daniel said...

DS - What I object to is first, trumpeting a conservative stance as if it were a virtue, and then second, using the language of the left to justify it.

Furthermore, this strange series of an apparent criticisms - masculinist (from gpatrick), authoritarian, culminating eventually in universalist!

Tell me this, why should we not we universalist? Why we should we not go to that level? You do realize, of course, that the right has no special reticence about doing so.

I reject this beautiful soul pose, this idea that we are somehow going to bring down capitalism with unicycles and fancy dress. I criticize it, because I don't believe it is leftist at all. If this is anti-capitalist thought, than anti-capitalist thought is a nullity.

10:29 AM  
Kenneth Rufo said...

The myth of victory over capitalism is the conviction that keeps it most firmly in place.

Revolution had its time and its place. The former has passed, the latter has been pervaded. I would think this apparent, but then again, that's because I don't buy into the claptrap that is Zizek's politics of the Real.

1:46 PM  
bat020 said...

"We are not attempting to produce some kind of revolutionary other, which is almost destined to fail."

The word "almost" is telling here. If revolution was destined to fail, it would be banally correct to make no attempt at it. If, however, it is almost destined to fail, then it exists as a possibility and to reject it is to make an politico-ethical choice - and a deeply conservative one at that.

3:32 PM  
Kenneth Rufo said...

Right, but it's the "almost" that keeps the hope alive, and thus ensures that the difficult day to day negotiations of how to transform capitalism into a more positive incarnation are ignored, while folks pontificate instead upon the possibility of a revolution that is always to come.

4:16 PM  
daniel said...

"the difficult day to day negotiations of how to transform capitalism into a more positive incarnation"

I find this a curious and perverse formulation - the idea that those who oppose capitalism in fact really *objectively* support it, by distracting from the actual task in hand, which is immanent negotiation.

This strikes me as sophism, for the reason that I cannot see either a definite object or coherent subject in it.

My question is this - who, exactly, are we (whoever "we" are) supposed to be negotiating with, and for what? A more positive incarnation of capitalism, fine - but more positive for whom exactly? In what way? What specific vision is being advanced here?

4:48 PM  
Wesley said...

The narcissistic politics of ‘the beautiful souls’, in which capitalism is imagined as the inhuman machine in opposition to the subversive romantic ego, is only the other side of drive, which transforms the ego into a devastating machine that will destroy every beautiful soul in its path. Narcissism and drive are two sides of the same coin, which is to say that Daniel and the phenomenon he critiques both equally suck. ;-)

6:13 PM  
Kenneth Rufo said...

Why fight capitalism at all? Who fights it? To what end? Your answers to those questions will supply the answers to your questions of me. To ask what one does not answer himself - that actually is sophist, as opposed to the vague pejorative you're tossing my way. Not that I object to sophistry, which has a bad, and very Platonic rap.

But to answer regardless: Begotiate for: environmental sustainability, improved labor conditions, the denaturalization of profit and of labor, the dilution of profit margins, the end of attachment, mindfuless of one's consumption, the lessening of ego and subjectivity, social and environmental justice. Negotiate with: each and every other with which we interact within a system of economic, social, and/or symbolic exchange. It's not about the specificity of the vision, but rather the means by which the vision obtains.

6:32 PM  
daniel said...

Wesley - please explain how you have arrived at this bizarre binary equation.

6:36 PM  
daniel said...

Beg-otiate: truly, a stunning Freudian slip with which to introduce a basically economist platform, as thoroughly criticized by Lenin here:

http://www.marx.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/sep/00.htm.

...and who I am happy to refer you as regards the answers to your other questions also.

6:49 PM  
Kenneth Rufo said...

Wow, and you critiqued Critchley for fidelity to his master. Go figure. And strangely, I'm familiar with this piece, just not convinced of/by it.

Oh, and to borrow from Dr. Katz: It's not a Freudian slip. More of a Jungian slip, if anything.

7:06 PM  
daniel said...

Kenneth - this is highly rhetorical. My problem with Critchley is not his discipleship per se, but rather somewhat more specific - in short, that he sanctifies Derrida's unwillingness to deploy truth, as itself truth.

For me, this move expresses one hand the essence of sophism - as I understand it, sophism equates to the ideological supplement of a more fundamental refusal to commit - but on the other hand, it in the case of Critchley, this a paradoxical refusal to commit, since it evinces a commitment to Derrida.

The signifier Lenin, on the other hand, did stand and does still stand for certain political axioms, which you may or may not agree with, but which nonetheless are at least concrete and clear.

In this way, I would suggest fidelity to the thought of Derrida and fidelity to the thought of Lenin do not amount to the same thing - mainly because one can never be entirely faithful to Lenin (since much of what he was concerned with was highly contingent, grounded in his own concrete situation, and in fact I advanced his name in reponse to a question concerning basic axioms of politics in the interests of concision) whereas it actually is possible to hold a pure fidelity to Derrida, since the essence of his position equates to nothing historical, but rather an eternal temptation of thought.

7:57 PM  
Kenneth Rufo said...

"Equates with nothing historical"?!?

What Derrida have you read? Never mind that. I don't want to trade reading lists. I've read "Different Maps" long enough to think you're a competent reader. So instead, how about what do you mean by historical? And if you don't think that resolves what I consider an obvious disconnect in interpretations of content, how about what you mean by "equates"?

And just so I understand. You're saying it's easier to commit to a thinker who you chastise for advocating a lack of commitment?

8:19 PM  
daniel said...

Okay, perhaps badly phrased, let me see if I can clarify this. What I mean is, much of what Lenin wrote was deployed in the form of polemics relating to concrete political issues, against concrete political enemies. Derrida, on the other hand, took his reference points mainly from the great texts of philosophy.

There is a significant difference in this already I think, but there is more here as well. I refer to your previous comment, "a revolution that is always to come."

Correct me if I am wrong, but is this not *precisely* the political position that Derrida proposes in Spectres of Marx?

It is this position that I say is non-historical (perhaps better, anti-historical) since, insofar as the revolution is always to come, it always is always to come, and therefore dissociated from all any particular historical continuums.

8:29 PM  
daniel said...

Incidentally, don't get me wrong - I respect Derrida tremendously, and furthermore am even sympathetic to his political position, such as it was - a position which in fact was profoundly conditioned by historical circumstances, to the extent that Derrida lived most of his life with the Soviet Union (Castoriadis: "The USSR, four words, all lies") to the left of him, and American-led Western capitalism to his right. In such circumstances, Derrida's radical indifference - not just lack of commitment, but rather positive refusal to commit - in a certain way made sense.

My problem is only, since the collapse of the USSR, and birth of essentially American fascism, is such a position really still feasible?

8:43 PM  
Kenneth Rufo said...

But Derrida also writes quite a bit about contemporary historical issues, on topics like: immigration, truth and reconciliation commissions, refugees, death penalty, international sovereignty, etc. Check Negotiations for examples.

It's not the majority of his scholarship, to be sure, but it's a substantial amount of writing, and I doubt there's a certain threshold that marks the quantity at which someone counts as worthy of being called properly historical. Or is there?

Of course, this runs far afield from the earlier issue, which is whether a Derridean-inspired approach can be effective as a negotiation or response tp the evils of capitalism, in a way more historically appropriate than is the revivalist application of a Lenin or a universalist Zizek...

8:54 PM  
daniel said...

True - well pointed out. I am aware of Negotiations, but I haven't read it, so I am unable to comment in detail.

I am curious about this, in the most of Derrida, his standard method would be, close reading of text, discovery of vanishing points (aporias), pointing out of said vanishing points - there it is! - but basic (principled) refusal to seize vanishing points: as Derrida understands it, there is always a sublime supracognitive ungraspable, finally irreducible dimension - with regard to invention, the gift, and so on - the famous im-possible.

From here, Derrida is able to point out the instances where, in the text of contemporary geopolitics, this dimension is betrayed. This is not nothing. On the other hand, Derrida is not precisely able to say *why* such is so, without slipping into a betrayal himself.

This strikes me as extremely problematic, since it seems that in the last analysis such a technique can only amount to a defensive rear-action after the fact: the perfect way to lose a war, supposing (with Marx) that one is fighting one.

9:27 PM  
Kenneth Rufo said...

I'm not sure I agree with your take on Derrida's approach/method, but whatever. Regardless, I'll happily agree we're in a fight, an endless one, and glibly deny that we're in anything remotely like a war.

12:40 AM  

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